

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)

ER 0315X 4 / 1 88

SUBJECT:

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		X		
13	D/OCA		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	C/LA/DO		X		
18	C/CATF/DO		X		
19	D/ALA/DI		X		
20					
21					
22	ER				
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

3 Mar '88

Date

3637 (10-81)

Executive Registry

88-0375X/1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1988
Brussels, Belgium

Dear Bob:

Today the House of Representatives will once again address the issue of continued assistance to Nicaragua's Freedom Fighters, a matter of great national security concern.

The case for such support is compelling. If we do not sustain the Nicaraguan Resistance, we face the prospect of a consolidated Marxist-Leninist regime on the American mainland and prolonged troubles for Nicaragua's democratic neighbors. If, on the other hand, meaningful assistance is provided, we can enhance the prospects for democracy inside Nicaragua and advance the cause of regional peace in accordance with the Guatemala Accords of August 1987.

It is, of course, not only the mere fact of continued assistance to the Freedom Fighters which is important. The quantity, nature and means of delivery of such help are also vital factors. I have said in the past and continue to maintain that our aid must be sufficient to sustain the Resistance in the field, provide equipment indispensable to those purposes and include effective means for transporting approved materials into Nicaragua under extraordinarily hazardous conditions.

This brings me to the question of the alternative assistance packages which the House will consider today. It is my considered judgment that the aid package offered by the Democratic Leadership does not meet the essential criteria I have outlined above. Their proposal will not enable us to sustain the Freedom Fighters inside Nicaragua at anywhere approximating their present numbers. The proposal would alter the delivery arrangements to DOD responsibility, a notion which I am not prepared to accept. And, finally, the Democratic Leadership's proposal would not assure a future vote on further assistance should the peace process fail to produce the results we all hope for. Without such provision it is quite obvious that all the Sandinistas have to do is play a waiting game instead of bargaining seriously with their internal opponents and democratic neighbors.



C-304P-IR

In contrast, the alternative put forward by the House Republican Leadership meets the minimum criteria I have outlined. Program responsibility would remain in the tried and tested hands of experienced professionals who have amply satisfied their oversight committees with their competence and thorough accountability. And, of course, the Republican alternative provides for expedited procedures in case of eventual need, an element which I consider indispensable to any package which ultimately emerges from the Congress.

Today could represent a watershed in our policies toward Central America. One avenue will lead to rapid debilitation of the Resistance and further encouragement of Sandinista intransigence. The other could keep alive prospects for democracy and meaningful talks toward peace. For the reasons set forth, I strongly urge you and your colleagues to vote against the proposal of the Democratic Leadership and in favor of the Republican package.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Minority Leader
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1988
Brussels, Belgium

Dear Charlie:

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Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Charles W. Stenholm
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

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19	D/ALA/DO		X		
20					
21					
22			X		
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

3 Feb '88

Date

3637 (10-81)

Executive Registry

88-0375X

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1988

Dear Bob:

On January 27, I transmitted to the Congress a request for \$36.25 million in further assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Our goal in Nicaragua is simple -- peace and democracy. Our policy has consistently supported the efforts of those who seek democracy throughout Central America and who recognize that the freedom fighters are essential to that process.

Ninety percent of my request is for non-lethal aid, including food, clothing, medicine and transportation. The other ten percent is for ammunition and air defense missiles that would not be available for delivery until after March 31, 1988 pending my certification that:

- at the time of the certification, no ceasefire is in place that was agreed to by the Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan democratic resistance;
- the failure to achieve such a ceasefire results from the lack of good faith efforts by the Government of Nicaragua to comply with the requirements of the Declaration of the Presidents of the Central American Nations at San Jose, Costa Rica on January 16, 1988; and
- the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has engaged in good faith efforts to achieve such a ceasefire.

As I have already stated, I would make that certification only after consulting personally with the Congress and the Presidents of the four Central American democracies, and I would give considerable weight to their views on the question of whether Nicaragua has complied with the San Jose Declaration.



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Furthermore, in the event that I find it necessary to make such a certification, I will notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate of my intention to do so ten days in advance. If the Congress adopts during that ten-day period a concurrent resolution stating that the Government of Nicaragua is in compliance with the San Jose Declaration, then I will refrain voluntarily from making the certification, and the suspension of lethal aid deliveries will continue.

I believe that this arrangement will afford Congress and the Executive branch the opportunity to address jointly the central question of Sandinista compliance with the commitments made at the San Jose Summit. Accordingly, I strongly urge that the Congress give its approval to my request of January 27, which in my judgment will serve to enhance the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the prospects for democracy in Central America.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Robert H. Michel
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 0176 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES 2
 FROM PAUL S. STEVENS AL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 2224
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NICARAGUAN AID / MICHEL LETTER

NSC#

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	MELVYN LEVITSKY	EXEC SEC	
DOD	COL WILLIAM M. MATZ	EXEC SEC	
CIA		EXEC SEC	

STAT

REMARKS FOR INFORMATION**URGENT**